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Abstract
Launching a rocket, running a business, driving to work and even day-to-day living all involve some degree of risk.
Risk is ever present yet not always recognized, adequately assessed and appropriately mitigated. I dentification,
assessment and mitigation of risk are elements of the risk management component of the “continuous improvement”
way of life that has become a hallmark of successful and progressive enterprises. While the application of risk
management techniques to provide continuous improvement may be detailed and extensive, the philosophy, ideals
and tools can be beneficially applied to all situations. Experiences with the use of risk identification, assessment and
mitigation techniques for complex systems and processes are described. System safety efforts and tools used to
examine potential risks of the Ares I First Stage of NASA’s new Constellation Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV)
presently being designed are noted as examples. Recommendations from lessons learned are provided for the
application of risk management during the development of new systems as well as for the improvement of existing
systems. Lessons learned and suggestions given are also examined for applicability to simple systems,
uncomplicated processes and routine personal daily tasks. This paper informs the reader of varied uses of risk
management efforts and techniques to identify, assess and mitigate risk for improvement of products, success of
business, protection of people and enhancement of personal life.
I ntroduction
Launching a rocket, running a business, flying in an airplane, operating machinery, driving to work, even crossing
the street all involve some degree of risk. I ndeed, life itself is risky business as all of us run the risk of dying of old
age if nothing else “gets us” first. Risk, defined as “the possibility of suffering harm or loss” (ref. 1), is ever present
to some extent in everything we do, yet we do not always recognize what risks we face. Sometimes we recognize
risk but fail to take steps to mitigate that risk even though the consequences may be significant. Recent events
relevant to economic conditions remind us of the financial risks to individuals, corporations, governments and even
insurance institutions that exist for the mitigation of potential risk. As each risk we face has the two components of
uncertainty and loss (ref. 2), we should structure our efforts to lessen either or both components thereby improving
the odds we can avoid the potential resultant loss or harm.
Risk management is the structure for dealing with risk, be it intentional and involved or subconscious and simple.
Risk management is "a discipline for living with the possibility that future events may cause adverse effects” (ref.
3). To persons in different situations, risk management takes on a different emphasis, yet the basics are the same.
Those in the financial industry have traditionally used sophisticated techniques including processes like currency
hedging and interest rate swaps. A project manager’s effort includes a focus on assuring the accurate tracking of
schedules and costs to assure a project is on time and within budget. I n the insurance industry, risk management is
accomplished by coordination of insurable risks and reduction of expenses. Safety professionals work to reduce
accidents and injuries on the job. Engineers designing rockets for manned space flight design with risk in mind
seeking to eliminate or mitigate risk before beginning to build. Continuous risk management (CRM) then is risk
management for risks that are assessed on an ongoing basis and used for decision making in all phases of a project.
CRM carries the risk forward and deals with it until it is resolved or until it turns into a problem with subsequent
loss (ref. 4). With risks present at all times in every aspect of life, the implementation of the principles of CRM
improves our odds of success and avoidance of problems by reducing the likelihood of occurrence and/or the
severity of consequences of suffering harm or loss.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20090037110 2019-08-30T08:10:41+00:00Z
Elements of the CRM Process
Improving our odds for success with CRM involves the continual use of the steps: identify, analyze, plan, track and
control all the while communicating the risk (Figure 1).
Figure 1 – CRM Process (ref. 5)
Identify – find the risks before they can become problems and result in loss or harm. A process of realizing
the uncertainty for loss or harm
• Capture the statement of risk in a way it can be described and measured
n 	 Given the (condition) there is a potential that (risk) could result in (consequence) . . .
• Capture the context of risk
n Include additional information relevant to the circumstances surrounding the identified
risk
• Communicate the identified risk
Analyze – process of examining the risk in order to tell the potential extent, severity and likelihood
• Evaluate the attributes of risks
n Impact
n Probability
n Timeframe
• Classify the risks
n Grouping of risks based on similar characteristics
• Prioritize the risks
n Ranking of risks to define those most significant or those that need the most attention
• Communicate the results or status of the analysis
Plan – decide what to do with risks and how to go about doing it
o	 Plan risk mitigation activities
o Assign responsibilities
o Communicate what is happening with the risk and how it is going
Track – follow the risk and the assigned risk responsibilities, collect more information
• Monitor the risk and all related actions
• Provide status reports
• Communicate information relative to the progress of the risk
Control – executing the risk mitigation activities that will reduce risks to levels where the uncertainties
(likelihood) and potential loss (severity) are reduced to an acceptable level
• Implement the controls
• Monitor the controls
• Communicate the effectiveness of the controls
Communication is the centerpiece that holds the CRM process together. It is present in each of the steps and, as
Figure 1 depicts, it holds all of the steps together as a central hub. Without communication, the process quickly
loses value (ref. 6).
Application of the CRM Process in the Simple and the Complex
The philosophy and ideals of CRM can be beneficially applied to all situations. While the application of risk
management techniques may be detailed and extensive for complex systems, application of some or all of the
principles of CRM are often applied in our every-day lives without realizing we are doing so.
A Very Simple, Real Life Example Provides an Illustration of Improving the Odds With CRM: A mother identifies
that given the proximity of a nearby street, there is a potential for her little child to run into that street with the
subsequent possibility the child could be struck by a passing vehicle resulting in severe injury or death. In an
instant, the mother analyzes the situation and, with concern for the safety of the child, determines the child must be
kept from the street. The mother acts immediately with her plan to mitigate the risk presented by the nearby street
as she separates the child from the hazard. Immediate plans include holding the child when outside to physically
prevent the child from nearing the street. Additional plans include a fence and gate with a lock to provide a physical
barrier between the child and the street as well as constant monitoring of the child’s outside activity. Over time as
the child grows old enough, the plans progress until eventually including teaching the child about the street and how
to be safe when near it and even how to cross it safely. All the while, the mitigation plans are being made and
enacted; the mother tracks the child continually, verifying that the controls that were put in place are always
effective. The mother is also constantly vigilant and ready to intervene if a weakness is found. While the mother
has gone through each of the CRM steps and identified, analyzed, planned, tracked and controlled to the extent
possible the risk the street presents to a child, she has continually communicated with the child the danger of the
street. Communication of the risk began with physical restraint and stern warnings of the street, then restrictions to
remain within an allowed boundary as the hazard mitigating barriers were put in place, then later the child was
taught how to be safe when near a street.
Example of Complex Systems and Processes Using Basic Principles of CRM Applied for the Reduction of Inherent
Risks (improving the odds): CRM principles and philosophies are used in launching rockets for manned space
flight. Even though formal tools, systems and processes are used to identify, analyze, plan, track, control and
communicate, the same CRM principles are used. NASA Space Shuttle Program Manager Wayne Hale has said
concerning all involved in any way with each shuttle mission, “Our collective job is to understand the risk, mitigate
it as much as possible, communicate accurately all around about the risk remaining, and then decide if we can go on
with that risk” (ref.7). ATK Launch Systems Inc. uses this philosophy employing a comprehensive CRM effort in
managing the risks of a complex system on NASA’s Constellation program, the next generation of manned space
vehicles presently in the design stage.
In designing the Ares I First Stage launch vehicle, part of the overall Constellation CLV, the risk management
process has been employed from the initial design stages. Program and project teams are responsible for identifying,
analyzing, planning, tracking, controlling, mitigating and communicating risks using a number of risk management
tools as depicted in Figure 2. Risk management is a continuous, iterative process to manage risk in order to achieve
program and mission success, it is a key element and an integral part of normal program and project management
and engineering processes.
Figure 2 — CRM Process Flow (ref. 8)
Under the umbrella of CRM (Figure 3), a complete array of system safety and reliability tools are used by ATK
Launch Systems to identify risks to flight through all life cycle phases.
Figure 3 – System Safety and Reliability Tools
Continuous, Life Cycle Risk Management: Risk-based Design
Program Risk, Product Hardware Risk, Process Risk, Support Process Risk
Facility and Process Risk, Supplier Risks, Other Risks
Risk Management Tools: Fault Tree Analysis, Hazard Analysis,
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List, Probabilistic Risk Assessment,
Lessons Learned, Brainstorming, etc.
Risk-based Design: The CRM process used for ATK Launch Systems Inc. Ares I First Stage Project for the
Constellation program began with risk-based design (RBD). RBD is a structured, formalized methodology in which
risk consideration becomes an integral part of the initial design process. The objective of RBD is to identify and
characterize risks during the concept development and preliminary design phases and communicate the risks with all
involved. As risks are identified and characterized, planning as to how to handle each risk is accomplished. The
first effort is to design out risks during these preliminary design phases. If it is not possible to design out risk, risk
mitigation techniques are applied to provide failure tolerance (i.e. redundancy). When designing in failure tolerance
is not possible or is prohibitive to the function of the system, efforts are then focused to design for minimum risk
(i.e. safety factors). If all efforts to address reduction of risk are not able to provide the desired improvement of
bringing the risk to an acceptable level, decisions are made to determine if there will be an acceptance of risk at that
present level or if it is “back to the drawing boards” for redesign. RBD involves the integration of design
engineering and project management with system safety, reliability, maintainability, supportability,
manufacturability, operability and affordability. Again the key to developing a RBD activity is the integration and
communication of risk identification and characterization within the design process. The early identification of risks
provides the opportunity to prioritize the allocation of resources based on the reduction of overall system risk.
Where applicable, RBD efforts use hazard analyses, fault tree analyses (FTA) and failure modes and effects analysis
(FMEA). NASA’s Constellation design process includes RBD activities at all design levels from the component to
the subsystem to the system to the stage or element level (i.e. Ares I First Stage) to the Ares system level (propulsion
elements) and the Orion system level (Crew elements) to the overall Constellation system. Where dominate failure
modes cannot be designed out, the design incorporates specific provisions to address the points of risk. Such
provision may include, but are not limited to, critical inspections, operating constraints, monitoring systems and
relief provisions.
Application of Risk Management Tools in Identifying, Assessing, Controlling and Verifying the Risks
Hazard Analyses: The use of hazard analyses is applied as a primary CRM effort used in an iterative manner.
Beginning with the preliminary hazard analyses, an examination of the design is provided to identify potential
hazards and hazard causes at a time when the design can be influenced and adjustments made to eliminate risks. As
the design matures, a subsystem hazard analyses is provided with controls that are identified for all residual risks
that could not be eliminated. The hazard analyses process continues to evolve with verification of controls through
testing, analysis and inspection of the design features. The hazard analyses become an ongoing examination of risks
to the flight article through all phases from manufacture through flight and the subsequent refurbishment and reuse
of hardware where applicable (ref. 9). Included with each hazard analysis is a risk matrix giving a visual depiction
of the estimation of relative risk with the hazardous condition in each report and the subsequent causes identified.
The risk matrix used by all Constellation element hazard analyses is defined by NASA in Constellation Project
document CxP 70038 and serves well as a discussion tool frequently used to fully vet the risk analyzed in each
hazard report. A similar risk classification matrix with red, yellow and green denoting high, medium and low risk
(Figure 4) is directed for use in the CRM process by another NASA document, CxP 72019.
Figure 4 – Risk Classification Matrix (ref. 10)
FTA: Preparation of a FTA of a system is used to identify hazardous conditions and their applicable causes. The
FTA is a system safety analysis technique which results in the following: 1) a logic tree developed using deductive
logic from a top-level, undesired event to all sub-events which could occur to cause the top event, 2) a graphic
representation of the various combinations of possible events along with the interrelationships of system events and
their dependence upon each other, and 3) identification of possible cause events and determination of where controls
should be applied to assure that the undesired event will not occur. For the Ares I First Stage, the FTA is developed
to the level of detail at which controls may be implemented thereby reducing the probability of loss of life or loss of
the Constellation system. The FTA has been used to identify the events, hazardous conditions and the hazard causes
that are addressed in each of the Ares I First Stage hazard reports.
FMEA/Critical Items List): The FMEA is used to identify potential failure modes of a part, component, or
subsystem and denote those where the occurrence would be critical or catastrophic. The Critical Items List (CIL)
provides the justification, frequently termed retention rationale, that explains how each particular failure mode is
controlled to an acceptable level. Hardware parts, components and subsystems are individually analyzed to
determine possible failure modes and what occurrences such as process failures, material defects, etc. could cause a
failure. The resulting worst-case effect of each failure mode is then assessed and documented. Using the
determined worst-case effects, all items are classified according to an associated failure criticality.
Criticality 1 – Single failure that could result in loss of life or vehicle
Criticality 1 R – Redundant hardware item(s), all of which, if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
Criticality 1S – Failure in a safety or hazard monitoring hardware item that could cause the system to fail to
detect, combat, or operate when needed during a hazardous condition, potentially resulting in loss of life or
vehicle
Criticality 2 – Single item failure that could result in loss of mission without loss of life
Criticality 2R – Redundant hardware item(s), all of which, if failed, could cause loss of mission
Criticality 3 – All failures that do not result in loss of life or loss of ability to complete the mission (ref. 11)
For the ATK Launch Systems Inc. Ares I First Stage of the overall Constellation system, the CI L is documented and
maintained for all criticality 1, 1 R, 1S, 2 and 2R failure modes. The CIL retention rationale documents how each
component, material or hardware item is certified and what design safety margins are included. The CIL retention
rationale also lists the inspections and tests performed during manufacturing and assembly processes that assure all
potential failure causes are controlled and that the controls are verified. Each inspection or test listed in the CIL
retention rationale is given a CIL code. These same inspections or tests with the corresponding CIL code are
attached to the respective manufacturing test or inspection that is found in the manufacturing and inspection plans.
CIL inspections and tests in manufacturing planning cannot be removed or changed without an assessment of risk,
changing the CIL retention rationale as applicable, and the subsequent review and approval from ATK Launch
Systems Inc. management and NASA. Regular audits of manufacturing planning are conducted by a system safety
engineer to verify that all the inspections listed in the CIL are properly called out in the planning. This process
ensures that building the Ares I First Stage to design will be repeatable and that documented retention rationale will
assure controls are in place so that potential failure modes will not occur (ref. 12).
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA): ATK Launch Systems defines PRA similar to others as “a comprehensive,
structured, and logical analysis methodology aimed at identifying and assessing risks one at a time in complex
technological systems”. PRA generally used for high reliability failure modes that present significant system
consequence is targeted at risk environments relative to the system that may involve the compromise of safety,
inclusive of the potential loss of life, personal injury and loss or degradation of high-value property. PRA has
become a principal analytical methodology for identifying and analyzing technical and safety risk associated with
complex systems, projects and programs such as the Ares I First Stage of the Constellation program. The ATK
Launch Systems, Ares I First Stage Reliability Plan says: “PRA feeds into and supports the risk management
activities by identifying dominant contributors (those events that contribute most to risk) so that resources can be
allocated to significant risk drivers and not wasted on items that insignificantly affect overall system risk. PRA
provides a framework to quantify uncertainties in events that are important to system safety. By requiring the
quantification of uncertainty, PRA informs the decision-makers of the sources of uncertainty and provides
information that determines the worth of investing resources to reduce uncertainty. PRA differs from reliability
analysis in three important respects: 1) PRA tends to focus on the evaluation of system failure while reliability
analysis tends to focus on the evaluation of system success, 2) PRA explicitly quantifies uncertainty while reliability
analysis nominally considers uncertainty in parameter estimates, and 3) PRA quantifies metrics related to the
occurrence of highly adverse consequences (e.g., fatalities, illness, loss of mission) as opposed to narrower system
performance metrics such as system reliability. PRA also differs from hazard analysis, which evaluates metrics
related to the effects of high consequence and low probability events treating them as if they have already occurred.
PRA results are directly applicable to resource allocation and other kinds of risk management decision-making
based on its broader consequence metrics”.
The PRA process is helpful in the identification of weaknesses and vulnerabilities in systems that have the potential
to adversely impact the safety, performance and mission success of the system. Such information provides insights
for viable risk management strategies for use in the reduction of risk and assists the decision-maker determine where
the expenditure of resources can most effectively be utilized in improving the design and operation in the most cost-
beneficial manner. The ATK Launch Systems, Ares I First Stage Reliability Plan also states: “The most useful
applications of PRA have been in the evaluation of complex systems subject to high-consequence events and the
evaluation of complex scenarios consisting of chains of less critical or insignificant events, that when combined
interact in a way that leads to a major system failure. Credible chain reaction failures are difficult to identify.
Thousands even tens of thousands of such scenarios can be formulated, but which of these are credible? Few tools
are available for such what-if analysis. Of these few tools, PRA analysis is perhaps the most useful”.
CRM Process: The risk management process for the Ares I First Stage program within ATK Launch Systems Inc. is
applied as a means to anticipate, mitigate and control risks and to focus resources where they can be most effectively
used to ensure overall success of the program. While the risks addressed through the hazard analyses, FTA,
FMEA/CIL and PRA tools are focused at the end item product, the CRM process is utilized to look at all risks. The
CRM process has been effectively initiated on the Ares I First Stage program beginning with preliminary design
concepts and has been utilized for working cost, schedule, technical and safety risks.
Ares I First Stage identified risks are subjected to the CRM process and are characterized utilizing the Ares risk
scorecard shown in Figure 5. After risks are properly defined and scored, a determination is made on the mitigation
necessary to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Usually risks are prioritized based on their relative standing with
other risks as ranked by likelihood and severity scores. The goal of risk management is, as a matter of efficiency, to
apply resources where they will have the greatest potential of reducing significant program risks. With the risks
scored, the overall significance is easily seen in descending significance from red to yellow then green. At times,
elevation is required to ensure that significant risks are communicated up the line of management and that needed
direction or resources are obtained for mitigation. As each risk has an owner, that person is required to monitor and
update mitigation plans showing completion or changes as well as provide a status at periodic risk reviews. As the
risk mitigation plan is being fulfilled, the reduction in risk can be depicted with a waterfall chart as shown in the
example in Figure 6. In addition to the risk management steps of identify, analyze, plan, track and control, the risk
management process for complex systems such as the Ares I First Stage program includes some formal
opportunities for documenting and communicating the risk including:
• Risks are identified and documented
• Significant risks (red and yellow at a minimum) are documented in the risk tracking database
• Each risk owner manages his risks
• A Risk Management Board (RMB) reviews new and high (red) risks and others needing special attention
as necessary
• The RMB elevates red risks and those needing external resources to the appropriate entity
Reasons for elevating a risk could be: 1) visibility to provide management insight, 2) a higher level assistance is
needed from the next higher level of management to share ownership and be able to carry out effective mitigation,
and 3) coordination is needed with other organizations and stakeholders. The risk owners are the persons that
identify risks requiring elevation.
Likelihood (Probability) of	 nce Ratingw
Probability Value DescriptionRating
pua1Itat1ve: Nearly certain to occur, requires immediate management attention; controls have little or no effect
Very High 5 Quantitative: 104 <P < 104 for risks with primaryimpacton safely or 50% <P < 100% for risks with primary impact
on cost, schedule or performance
Qualltaliw: Highly likelyto occur, most cases require management attention; controls have significant uncertainties
High 4 Quantitative: 10<P < 10 4 for risks with primaryimpaclon safety or 33%<P X50% for risks with primary impacton
cost, schedule or performance
Qualltaliw: May occur, management required in some cases; controls ebst with some u ncertainties
Moderate 3 Quantitative: 104 <P < 10 for risk with primary impa ct on safely or 10% <P ^ 3 3% for ri sks with pri mary impact
on cost, schedule or performance
Qualltaliw: Not likely to occur, management not required in most cases; controls have minor limitationel uncertainties
Low 2 Quantitative: 104 <P < 104 for risks with primary impact on safety or 5%<Pjc10% for risks with primary impact on
cost, schedule or performance
Qualltaliw: Very unlikelylo occur, management not required in all cases; strong controls in place
Very Low 1 Quantitative: P < 106 for risks with primary impact on safety or P < 5% for risks with primaryimpacton cost,
schedule or performance
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Figure 5 – Ares Risk Scorecard (ref. 13)
Figure 6 – Risk Waterfall Chart (ref. 14)
Summary of Improving Our Odds: Success Through CRM
While designing a rocket intended to launch humans into space is an extremely complex enterprise and while
crossing a street is a simple routine effort, both endeavors can and should be preceded with an assessment of risk.
Failure to do so in either case could lead to catastrophic results. Sometimes we fail to recognize risk, other times we
recognize risk but disregard the steps to mitigate it even though the consequences may be significant. The
application of the risk management process is effective in structuring our efforts to lessen the likelihood and/or the
severity of risks we face. To persons in different situations, risk management takes on a different emphasis, yet the
basics are the same. The philosophy and ideals of CRM can be beneficially applied to all situations. As noted, the
risk management structure of identify, analyze, plan, track and control for dealing with risk can be used intentionally
and in very involved ways or it can be applied subconsciously in simply situations, either way it will improve our
odds of success.
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• RISK is always present in everything we do be it a simple act or a major, 
complex operation:
C i St t• ross ng a ree
• Video Clip of Man crossing street 
• Launching a Rocket
• ATK DVD “Vision – Innovation- Execution”
• We Can Improve our odds of success through Continuous Risk 
Management
• Risk Management can be used for simple processes in an unconscious manner to 
make us safer.  Is almost imperative to use for large enterprises if risk is to be 
reduced to acceptable levels
• Risk Management is the structure for dealing with risk, be it intentional and 
involved or subconscious and simple.
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• Risk Management is "a discipline for living with the possibility that future 
events may cause adverse effects”
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“It ain't what you don't know that gets you into
trouble It's what you know for sure that just.         
ain't so.”
M k T iar  wa n
“You've got to be very careful if you don't         
know where you're going, because you might 
t t th ”no  ge  ere.
Yogi Berra
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Risk Management
Risk Management PREDICTS, and then mitigates events that could prevent us from  reaching our 
objectives.  Our other measures of performance look in the “rear-view mirror” to see what 
HAS happened and, therefore, do nothing to prevent risks from coming to pass.
Risk Management is a culture, a way of doing business, and a duty of all program, functional   members and 
stakeholders.  It is not a tool, a place, or a person.  It is a continuous process shared by all program and 
functional personnel to capture communicate and mitigate risks over the life of a program or function
3
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The Continuous Risk Management Process
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Risk Management Process
Identify – find the risks before they can become problems and result in loss or harm.  A 
process of realizing the uncertainty for loss or harm        
z Capture the statement of risk in a way it can be described and measured
z Given the (condition) there is a potential that (risk) could result in (consequence) 
z Capture the context of risk
z Include additional information relevant to the circumstances 
surrounding the identified risk
C i t th id tifi d i kz ommun ca e e en e  r s
z Communicate – Communicate - Communicate 
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Examples of communicating Risk
Poor
These risk statements are too general.  They are concerns, certainly, but don’t give enough 
specifics to tackle in a meaningful way
“Given the complexity of the vehicle there is a potential for errors to occur which could result in disaster.”
“Given the dynamics of the program, there is a potential for inaccurate flow downs and interface breakdowns, 
which could result in costly/evolving changes”
“Given the overall vehicle complexity, there is a potential for safety or quality disconnects, which could 
adversely affect performance, mission completion or result in system failure.”
Better
These risk statements or more specific and will help focus mitigation planning
“Given the potential for error in the results of the random vibration analysis, there is a potential of                 
underestimating the environment, which could result in a failure to verify avionics boxes to their flight 
environment leading to the worst case scenario of flight failure.”
“Given the potential for errors in the structural dynamics predictions there is a potential for incorrect vehicle 
modes which could result in loss of vehicle (structural breakup, fluid exhaustion, etc).
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“Given that we have specified stages and have not established design to cost metrics, there is a potential that 
the vehicle may carry too high an inert weight to payload fraction, resulting in degraded market potential.”
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Analyze – process of examining the risk in order to tell the potential extent, severity and 
likelihood 
z Evaluate the attributes of risks
z Impact
z Probability
z Timeframe
z Classify the risks  
z Grouping of risks based on similar characteristics
z Prioritize the risks
z Ranking of risks to define those most significant or those that need the most 
attention
z Communicate the results or status of the analysis 
Plan – decide what to do with risks and how to go about doing it
z Plan risk mitigation activities
z Assign responsibilities
C i t h t i h i ith th i k d h it i i
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Track/Document – follow the risk and the assigned risk responsibilities, collect more 
information
z Monitor the risk and all related actions
z Provide status reports  
z Communicate information relative to the progress of the risk
Control – executing the risk mitigation activities that will reduce risks to levels where the 
uncertainties (likelihood) and potential loss (severity) are reduced to an acceptable 
level
z Implement the controls
z Monitor the controls
C i h ff i f h lz ommun cate t e e ect veness o  t e contro s
• COMMUNICATION is the centerpiece that holds the Continuous Risk 
M t t thanagemen  process oge er                                                         
8
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Continuous, Life Cycle Risk Management: 
Risk-based Design 
P Ri k P d t H d Ri k Program s , ro uc  ar ware s , rocess 
Risk, Support Process Risk, Facility and Process 
Risk, Supplier Risks, Other Risks
11
Advanced Risk Management Tools:  Reliability Analysis, PRA, FMEA/RECA, 
FMECA, PFMEA/PRECA, Brainstorming, ETC.
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Definitions
Risk – A credible future event that would prevent you from reaching a 
goal or objective – something that could go wrong with a planned 
activity (Problem vs. Risk)
Risk Level – A combination of the likelihood that a risk will happen,  with 
the severity of its consequence if it does happen – Consequences are 
typically categorized as to Safety Cost Technical and/or Schedule    , ,   
Mitigation – A planned, scheduled and funded action to reduce the 
likelihood or severity of a risk     
(An unplanned, unfunded, unscheduled action is could be called a hallucination)  
12
A premier aerospace and  defense company
Improving Our Odds: Success Through Continuous Risk Management
Assess Risks - Likelihood
N t “ t i bl ”o  wors  conce va e case
Determination of risk is for “worst credible case”
Not “best case” (all success type)
Likelihood / Probability can be either quantitative or qualitative
Qualitative
Subjective Evaluation based on a Simple Scale      
i.e. – “Remote” to “Near Certain” “1-5”
Quantitative
Probability Risk Assessment (PRA)
Reliability Analysis
Event Sequence Analysis
Statistical Probability based on Historical Data
Etc.
13
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Assess Risks - Severity
N “ i bl ”ot worst conce va e
Determination of risk is for “worst credible case”
Not “best case” (all case success type)
Severity is qualitative
If words on card do not match your need, change them
What is required is a gradation – from minor to catastrophic
FMECA, HA, PHA, Crit 1, Crit 1R, Crit 2, Crit 3 designations
are all tools, but still use subjective evaluations (peer reviewed, rigorous 
process)
Likelihood x Severity (Risk) “number” allows us to place challenges in a gross 
14
prioritization which is used for resource prioritization
A premier aerospace and  defense company
Improving Our Odds: Success Through Continuous Risk Management
LIKELIHOOD OF RISK OCCURRING
Program Requirements Design Analyze Procure Integrate Test Launch
Good probability of requirement deficiencies 
impacting program
New, unproven 
design based on 
advanced 
materials, 
processes or 
theories
Unproven 
analytical 
approach derived 
from advanced 
theory 
Vendor delivering 
radical departure 
from heritage 
product line
Assembly, 
integration, or 
manufacturing 
based on un-proven 
tooling, parts, 
materials, or 
processes
Unproven test 
method using new 
test equipment 
Unprecedented 
launch operation 
activity being 
conducted by 
inexperienced crew
5
Moderate chance of requirement 
deficiencies impacting program
New design 
based on low TRL 
technology
Application of a 
new analytical 
approach on a 
new product
Vendor 
development 
based on new 
design
Assembly, 
integration, or 
manufacturing 
based on 
developmental 
tooling, parts, 
materials, or 
processes
Unproven test 
method using 
modified test 
equipment 
Routine launch 
operation activity 
being conducted by 
inexperienced crew
4
Some chance of requirement deficiencies 
impacting program
New design 
based on mature 
technology
Application of a 
new analytical 
approach on an 
existing product
Vendor 
development 
based on existing 
design
Assembly, 
integration, or 
manufacturing 
based on major 
modifications to 
proven tooling and 
PMP
Modified test 
method using 
modified test 
equipment 
Experienced crew 
conducting new 
launch operation for 
first time
3
Minor 
modifications to 
existing design, 
or existing design 
Application of a 
validated 
analytical 
approach on a 
Vendor to make 
minor 
modifications to 
Assembly, 
integration, or 
manufacturing 
based on minor 
modifications to
Modified test 
method using 
existing test 
Minor change to a 
routine activity being 
conducted by an 
Program Phases
requirements are appropriate with little 
margin
used in new 
environment
newly developed 
product
heritage design   
proven tooling and 
PMP
equipment experienced crew
2
Requirements will be met with ample margin
Existing design 
used in similar 
environment
Use of validated 
analytical 
approach in 
existing 
application 
Mature 
commodity 
purchased from 
industry leader
Assembly, 
integration, or 
manufacturing 
based on existing 
tooling, parts, 
materials, or 
processes
Proven test 
method using 
existing test 
equipment 
Routine launch 
operations activity 
conducted by 
experienced crew
1 2 3 4 5
Technical 
(KPP)
Performance shortfall 
meets intent of 
requirement 
Acceptable 
performance shortfall 
resulting in reduced 
capability 
Unacceptable 
performance shortfall 
requiring 
redesign/rework 
within experience 
base
Unacceptable 
performance shortfall 
requiring 
redesign/rework 
outside experience 
base
Fails to meet 
requirement, and no 
alternative exists
Flight
Most comprehensive 
success criteria are 
met despite anomaly 
All minimum success 
criteria and most 
comprehensive 
criteria are met 
All minimum success 
criteria are met, but 
most comprehensive 
criteria are not
Most minimum and 
some comprehensive 
success criteria are 
met 
Most minimum 
success criteria are 
not met 
Safety
No injury or illness to 
public, crew or 
personnel
Minor firsr aid 
treatment (does not 
adversely effect 
personal safety or 
health)
Medical treatment for 
a minor injury or 
incapacitation 
(OSHA reportable)
Serious injury           
or illness resultion in 
lost time
Death or permanent 
disability
Cost overrun Cost overrun Cost overrun 
CONSEQUENCE OF RISK OCCURRING
Cost
Cost overrun 
contained within 
program reserves
exceeds program 
reserves, but 
additional fund are 
available and 
justified
exceeds program 
reserves, additional 
funds require 
impacting other 
projects
exceeds program 
reserves, rationale 
for project 
continuation is 
debatable
Cost impact severely 
erodes value of 
effort, justifying 
project termination
Schedule
Schedule variance is 
contained within 
available reserve
Schedule variance is 
recoverable within 
available resources
Schedule variance is 
recoverable using 
additional resources
Schedule variance is 
un-recoverable, and 
additional resources 
needed to contain 
impact
Schedule variance is 
un-recoverable, 
severely diminishes 
value of effort
Qualitative: Highly likely to occur.
Controls have significant uncertaintiesHigh4
Qualitative: Nearly certain to occur.  
Controls have little or no effect.
Quantitative: ~10-1 
Very High5
LIKELIHOOD RATING
CxP Risk Summary Card
Frequency of
Hazard Severity
Qualitative: Very unlikely to occur. 
Strong Controls in Place
Quantitative:  ~10-5
Very Low1
Qualitative: Not likely to occur. 
Controls have minor limitations/uncertainties.
Quantitative: ~10-4 
Low2
Qualitative: May occur.  
Controls exist with some uncertainties.
Quantitative:  ~10-3 
Moderate3
   .
Quantitative: ~10-2 
D th l fP tl di bli i jS l t i j
54321Consequence
54321
1
2
3
4
5
CONSEQUENCE
L
I
K
E
L
I
H
O
O
D
>9 monthsFar
>3 Months but <9 monthsMid
0 to 3 monthsNear
Timeframe
Mi i j ti lMinor first aid treatment though
(1)
Catastrophic
(2)
Critical
(3)
Marginal
(4)
Negligible
(A) Frequent 1A 2A 3A 4A A
(B) Probable 1B 2B 3B 4B B
 
Occurrence
Inability to support further CxP flight 
operations
Permanent usage loss or LOCM 
of major element(s) of flight
Temporary usage loss or LOCM 
of major element(s) of flight
Permanent usage loss or 
LOCM of non flight critical
Temporary usage loss or 
LOCM of non flight criticalSupportability
Contingency AbortFailure to achieve major mission 
objectives
Moderate impact to operations –
workarounds available
Minor impact to operations 
– workarounds available
Negligible impact to mission 
objectives/operationsOperations
Technical goals not achievable with 
existing  engineering 
capabilities/technologies
Major impact to 
requirements/design margins
Moderate impact to 
requirements/design margins
Small impact to 
requirements/design 
margins
Negligible impact to 
requirements/design 
margins
Requirements
Performance
(mission 
success)
ea  or oss o  crew   ermanen y sa ng n uryevere or ong- erm n ury or 
occupational illness
Safety
Personnel
System Safety
Environmental
Minor damage to secondary
Or non-essential flight assets 
Minor damage to Program 
critical assets, major damage 
to non-essential assets
Minor damage to flight assets, or 
major damage to Program critical 
assets, or loss of non-essential 
assets
Major damage to flight assets, 
Or loss of Program critical assets
Loss of flight assets
Negligible OSHA/EPA violation
Non-reportable
Minor reportable OSHA/EPA 
violation
Moderate OSHA/EPA violation which 
requires immediate remediation
Major OSHA/EPA violation causing 
temporary stoppage
Serious or repeat OSHA/EPA violations 
resulting in action terminating project
nor n ury or occupa ona  
illness
     
would not adversely affect 
personal safety or health
 
(C) Occasional 1C 2C 3C 4C C
(D) Remote 1D 2D 3D 4D D
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>5 month delay to Major Program 
critical path/milestones or can not 
meet major milestones
(SRR, PDR, CDR, SAR)
>1 and ≤5 month 
Program/Project critical 
path/milestones (SRR, PDR, 
CDR, SAR)
≤ 1 month delay to 
Program/Project milestone 
(SRR, PDR, CDR, SAR)
Minor overall schedule 
impact (Accommodate with 
reserve, no impact to critical 
path)
Negligible schedule impact
Schedule
>15%
-Or-
> $50 M
>10%, but ≤15%
-Or-
$10 M - $50 M
>5%, but ≤10%
-Or-
$1 M - $10 M
>2%, but ≤5%
-Or-
$100 K - $1 M
≤ 2% 
-Or-
< $100 K
Cost
(Estimate to Complete)
     
vehicle or ground facility
     
vehicle or ground facility
  -   
asset
  -   
asset
CxP 70056, Cx Program Risk Management Plan
(E) Improbable 1E 2E 3E 4E E
1 2 3 4
A premier aerospace and  defense company
Improving Our Odds: Success Through Continuous Risk Management
Why look at Risk Synergies?
Individual risks can stack up to be more significant than they might appear 
individually  
If only look individually may mis-prioritize and not commit resources 
where they are most critical
Example 1: Single poisonous snake in a large yard – risk
2nd single poisonous snake (SPS) in a large yard – risk
3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th SPS in a large yard – low risk
6 poisonous snakes in a large yard – low risk to me, I’m
staying away from that yard together very high risk
May seem obvious, but six different schedule risk items are often assessed 
as low risk individually.  The combination of these can be catastrophic to a 
Program and need to be assessed (appropriate) for mitigation that way.
Cost risks can be the same
16
     .
Capacity planning can be the same.
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To Mitigate (ALL red risks and red synergies and selected yellow / green):            
A.  Understand root cause of risk
B.  Employ ALL of the following:
1) Consider mitigations that reduce either likelihood
2) Consider mitigations that reduce either severity
3) Consider mitigations that are reactive to the risk being 
realized i.e. contingency plans (i.e. coming back on line, 
hang-fire planning recovery after an earthquake) ,    
4) Analysis actions (define the actions that will enable 
understanding so that mitigation plans can be more 
ff ti I f d d i i ki )e ec ve – n orme  ec s on ma ng
C.  Mitigate risk synergies as required for highest Program benefit
D.  Create a funded, scheduled activity that is tracked as part of program 
plan – risks mitigations are to below red levels – how far below is 
18
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Wh t Ri k Miti ti i N ta  s  ga on s o
Analysis doesn’t change risk if hardware, resources, requirements or tools are not 
h d ti i k f h i k ( hi h ll i ’t f l tc ange  – excep on: r s  o  av ng an un nown w c  genera y sn  use u  o 
track except for having a >10% Program reserve at initiation of a properly funded 
Program)
Getting through a review is not a risk mitigation 
An unfunded, unscheduled, albeit thought-out approach, is not a risk mitigation
Changing a risk number due to Programmatic / Functional pressures, without new 
data, or merely deciding to accept a level of risk is not mitigation
Mitigating a direct / immediate cause, without mitigating the root cause is not an 
effective mitigation
Out waiting the risk item (finding out in test if performance is acceptable) is not a
19
                
mitigation
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• RISK is present in everything we do be it a simple act or a major, complex 
operation.  We can choose to over look risks and manage the consequences 
when they become incidents:
Incident
Management
Plan
Manage
Risk
21
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Pl
Manage
Incidents
Manage
Risk
an
We can use the Continuous Risk Management
22
       
Model to Improve Our Odds of Being Successful 
and Avoiding Loss
